Surprise, Surprise Surprise: Gomer Pyle’s Iran Policy

Last week Iran’s President tells the International Atomic Energy Agency of its plans to enrich uranium at its Natanz centrifuge plant to nearly 20 percent purity. In late January, the Islamic Republic hung two men convicted of being Mohareb (enemies of God), the first executions of dissidents since protests over the disputed presidential poll in June. Startlingly, it’s been since September 25, 2009 since this BTS published Eyes Wide Open – No denying Iran’s Intentions and nothing has changed Iran’s nuclear trajectory.  Take a look at the timeline of events below and you too will understand that only someone as slow to grasp reality as Private Pyle could utter “surprise, surprise, surprise” when Iran does in fact join the nuclear weapons fraternity. The timeline illustrates the world’s leading exporter of terror‘s modus operandi of fanning cooperation while instead fast-tracking its weapons-grade uranium enrichment program.

 

  • Jan. 6, 2010: The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) – the military wing of the Islamic Republic that wields political and economic control over Iran’s gas, oil and nuclear projects – announces plans to conduct military exercises in the Straits of Hormuz at the end of January to send the message that if Iran is attacked it will retaliate with force, and through regional cooperation the Persian Gulf and the Hormuz would be protected from foreign powers.
  • Jan 5, 2010: (IRGC) withdraws $1 billion to proceed with its South Pars gas venture. The cash withdrawal coincides with U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s announcement that the United States and its allies are discussing possible new sanctions that will specifically target the IRGC. 
  • Jan. 2, 2010: Iran issues an ultimatum to the United States warning that if the United States doesn’t accept Tehran’s counterproposal by the end of January it will commence reactor fuel production at increased levels of enrichment.
  • Dec. 29, 2009: News emerges that Iran is close to clinching a $450 million deal to import 1,350 tons of purified ore uranium, or “yellowcake,” from one of the world’s biggest uranium miners, Kazakhstan. The deal would be a direct violation of UN sanctions placed on Iran for refusing to halt its nuclear program and raises concerns in Washington. Iran and Kazakhstan deny that there’s any such deal.
  • Dec. 22, 2009: Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad publicly dismisses a year-end deadline stipulating that Iran must send out of the country more than 70 percent of its low-enriched uranium “in one batch” to avoid additional UN sanctions. The deadline, set by the world’s major powers – the P5+1 (the United States, Britain, France, Russia, China and Germany) – stipulates that in accordance with the Oct. 1 proposal, Iran must send out more than 70 percent of its low-enriched uranium “in one batch” to avoid additional UN sanctions.  
  • Dec. 18, 2009: The Times of London exposes secret Iranian intelligence documents that outline a four-year trial project that includes the neutron initiator, a final element for creating a nuclear bomb that triggers an explosion, as well as uranium deuteride, which experts say can only be used in for nuclear weapons. Intelligence sources say the documents date back to 2007, raising doubt over Iran’s claim that it stopped its weapons program four years prior.
  • Dec. 16, 2009: Iran successfully tests an upgraded version of its Selij-2 surface-to-surface missile, which has a range of up to 1,200 miles and is capable of striking U.S. bases in the Persian Gulf and Israel. An early model of the Selij-2 was launched in May.
  • Dec. 12, 2009: Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr  Mottaki proposes exchanging 880 lbs. (400 kg) of low-enriched uranium, instead of the 2,645 lbs. (1,200 kg) specified in the Oct. 1 agreement, which requires Iran to send its uranium to Russia for enrichment “in one batch.”
  • Nov. 29, 2009: Iran announces plans to build an additional 10 uranium enrichment sites, in defiance of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) demands that Iran halt its enrichment activities.
  • Nov. 27, 2009: In a 27-3 vote, the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Board of Governors passes a resolution calling on Iran to halt uranium enrichment activities, including construction of the Qom facility, in compliance with previous UN Security Council Resolutions.
  • Nov. 18, 2009: Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki says Iran “definitely” won’t send out of the country more than 70 percent of its low-enriched uranium, rejecting the deal negotiated on Oct. 1.
  • Nov. 3, 2009: A cargo ship filled with tons of Iranian weaponry en route to Iran-backed Hezbollah in Lebanon is intercepted 100 miles (161 km) from Israel’s coast. It was carrying more than 500 tons of advanced weaponry and missiles, including Katyusha rockets, assault rifles, mortar shells, grenades, and anti-aircraft platforms. The containers aboard were imprinted with the acronym IRISL (Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines) and cargo slips proved the weapon containers were from Iran.
  • Oct. 29, 2009: Iran reneges on its acceptance of the Oct. 1 Geneva proposal, rejecting the condition to send three-quarters of its low-enriched uranium to Russia all at once. Instead, Iran offers a verbal counter proposal that would require sending out in batches its stockpile of low-enriched uranium. Iran also cancels future high-level talks about its nuclear program.
  • Oct. 27, 2009: An Iranian ship laden with weapons, including missiles, is seized off of Yemen’s northwestern Midi harbor. With four Iranians aboard, Yemeni security sources believe that the weapons were destined for Iran-backed Shia Al-Houthi militants based northern Yemen.  
  • Oct. 24, 2009: Iran misses the IAEA deadline to accept a proposed agreement to ship its enriched uranium supply to Russia; Iranian officials say they need more time to review the proposal.
  • Oct. 21, 2009: IAEA negotiators draft a deal based on the Oct. 1 proposal that requires Iran to send to Russia three-quarters of its low-enriched uranium by the end of the year for reprocessing.
  • Oct. 17, 2009: Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez announced that Iran is helping Venezuela explore and eventually mine its uranium deposits. Venezuela reportedly has 50,000 tons of uranium reserves.
  • Oct. 2 2009: Iran announces its plans to install a more advanced type of centrifuge at the recently disclosed Qom fuel enrichment facility.
  • Oct. 1, 2009: Iran conditionally accepts the P5+1 proposal negotiated in Geneva, which would require Iran to deliver more than 70 percent of its low-enrichment uranium to Russia and France for refinement into fuel for a medical research plant, as well as permit IAEA inspectors to inspect the Qom facility within two weeks of the agreement. The P5+1 includes the five permanent members of the UN Security Council — the United States, France, Britain, Russia and China plus Germany.
  • Sept. 27, 2009: Speaking about the newly revealed Qom facility, the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei’s chief of staff says, “This new plant, God willing, will soon become operational and will make the enemies blind.”
  • Sept. 25, 2009: President Obama, along with British Prime Minister Gordon Brown and French President Nicolas Sarkozy reveal that Iran has been Iran covertly developing a nuclear enrichment site in Qom, hidden inside a mountain. Iran’s other enrichment plant at Natanz—also developed covertly—was discovered in 2002 after an Iranian dissident group revealed its existence. Newsweek reported a U.S. counterterrorism official saying that intelligence agencies know the Qom facility was under construction for years.
  • Sept. 21, 2009: The IAEA confirms it received Iran’s letter informing the UN watchdog of Iran’s intentions to construct a new pilot fuel enrichment facility near the city of Qom.
  • Sept. 9, 2009: Iran submits a five-page proposal to the P5+1 group, agreeing to commence a broad dialogue with the world powers on issues other than its nuclear program, such as security and economic cooperation.  The updated proposal comes five months after the P5+1 tendered a package for collective dialogue and is rejected by the world powers, which gave Iran until the end of September to commence negotiations.
  • Sept. 7, 2009: Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad vows to continue Iran’s nuclear program despite the threat of new international sanctions.
  • Sept. 5, 2009: Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez makes his eighth official visit to the Islamic Republic during which he agrees to export 20,000 barrels a day of gasoline to Iran to ease Tehran’s fuel deficiency resulting from international sanctions against such energy-related imports. Chavez tells Iran’s Press TV that he seeks Iran’s help to build a “nuclear village” in Venezuela.
  • Aug. 29, 2009: An IAEA report reveals that Iran has neither stopped nor decreased uranium enrichment at the Natanz plant, contrary to recent reports. There are international concerns that Iran is developing nuclear warheads, missile re-entry vehicles and other weapons.
  • Aug. 21, 2009: Iran grants IAEA inspectors access to its almost-completed Arak nuclear reactor, as well as increased monitoring of the Natanz uranium enrichment site. The IAEA continues to believe Tehran might be hiding other nuclear sites.
  • July 21, 2009: Iranian Ambassador to Moscow Seyed Mahmoud Reza Sajjadi tells Iran’s Fars News Agency that the Bushehr plant will be operational by the end of the 2009.
  • June 16-17, 2009: In BBC televised interviews, IAEA Chief Mohamed ElBaradei says “It is my gut feeling that Iran would like to have the technology to enable it to have nuclear weapons,” adding that ”They want to send a message to their neighbors, to the rest of the world, ‘Don’t mess with us.’ “
  • June 13, 2009: Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad wins a second term as president, but his victory against reformist contender Mir-Hossain Moussavi is highly disputed by the Iranian people, sparking a wave a pro-reform protests. The Iranian regime sets out to quash the protests through violence. In an effort to silence the international press and outside powers from criticizing Iran’s measures, international media outlets are expelled from the country and Iranian leaders publicly accuse the United States and the United Kingdom of “interfering in Iran’s domestic affairs” and inciting the protests.
  • June 11, 2009: Diplomatic sources say Iran rejects IAEA inspector requests to install an additional surveillance camera at the Natanz enrichment facility.
  • June 5, 2009: The IAEA reports the installation of a total of 7,052 centrifuges, with 4,920 already enriching uranium and 2,132 ready to begin uranium enrichment.[46] Iran’s production rate of 2.75 kilograms per day of low-enriched uranium (LEU) would accumulate enough weapon-grade uranium to create two nuclear weapons by February 2010. If all reported 7,052 centrifuges were used, this could happen as early as mid-December 2009.
  • June 5, 2009: Iran continues to deny the IAEA access to the IR-40 reactor currently under construction at Arak and design plans for another reactor in Darkhovin. Access to the reactor at Arak has been denied since August 2008, preventing the IAEA from monitoring uranium enrichment progress.
  • May 20, 2009: Iran tests a Sajil-2 two-stage surface-to-surface missile with a range of 1,243 miles (2,000 km), powered by a solid fuel propellant. Solid-fuel allows for a smaller missile that is more difficult to intercept.
  • April 19, 2009: Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad states that regardless of western sanctions aimed at curbing its nuclear program, Iran’s development is a moving “train with no brake and reverse gear.”
  • April 17, 2009: Canadian authorities charge Iranian national and Toronto resident Mahmoud Yadegari of attempting to illegally export nuclear technology components to Iran, which is strictly prohibited by UN Security Council Resolution 1737.[51] Yadegari sought to export pressure transducers, which are used in the uranium enrichment process, but also has military technology applications.
  • April 9, 2009: Iran celebrates National Day of Nuclear Technology, the anniversary when uranium was first enriched in 2006, inaugurating the Esfahan nuclear plant’s production of fuel pellets that will power the Arak heavy-water reactor, the installation of about 7,000 centrifuges at the Natanz plant and its capacity to boost uranium enrichment with two new centrifuge models.
  • April 9, 2009: At an inaugural ceremony at the Isfahan plant, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad states, “We are ready to hold talks with the West but these talks should be based on the principle of justice and equality and respect of Iran’s (nuclear) rights.”
  • April 3, 2009: Chavez visits Tehran to inaugurate the Iran-Venezuela Development Bank. The bank was established by the Export Development Bank of Iran, which was placed under sanctions by the U.S. Treasury for allegedly financing Iran’s nuclear program. An Iranian state media report said the bank’s initial capital totaled $2 million, but, “the capital will be raised to 1.2 billion dollars with the aim of supporting joint economic, industrial and mining projects as well as speeding up the current projects.”
  • March 16, 2009: An Iranian unmanned aerial drone is shot down in Iraqi airspace according to the U.S. military.
  • March 10, 2009: Chairman of the Iran sanctions committee and Japan’s UN Ambassador Yukio Takasu accuses Iran of violating UN Security Council Resolution 1737 when an Islamic Republic Iran Shipping Lines chartered ship was seized off the coast of Cyprus. UNSC Resolution 1737 prohibits Iran from importing or exporting weapons-related material. The ship, which was due to dock in Syria, contained 125-mm armor-piercing guns and bullet shells, as well as high-explosive gun charges and anti-tank propellant – weapons that diplomats suspect were intended for Lebanon or Gaza
  • March 2, 2009: Managing Director of Farnas Aerospace Company Hamed Saeedi announces that Iran will commence mass-production of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), stating the “drones will be of the tactical type, with a short range of 400 to 500 meters flying altitude which cannot be detected by radio waves as they will be stealth aircraft.” The Fars News Agency article also quotes Iranian Air force Commander Brig.-Gen.  Hassan Shahsafi saying in February that the UAVs will join the force’s fleet in the next eight months.
  • Feb. 25, 2009: One week after the IAEA reports Iran has decreased activities at the Natanz nuclear facility, Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization Chief Gholamreza Aghazadeh announces that, “Currently we have 6,000 running centrifuges in Natanz and we will increase our activities to install more by the end of next (Iranian) year (to March 2010),” with the intention of enriching uranium by installing 50,000 centrifuges within five years.
  • Feb. 19, 2009: The IAEA reports that Iran has produced a total of 2,227 lbs. (1,010 kilograms) of low-enriched uranium. This is a third more than Iran’s previously disclosed figure. UN officials attribute the 460-lb. (209 kilograms) discrepancy to measurement errors. The report also found a total of 5,600 centrifuges, significantly more than the 3,800 centrifuges previously listed.
  • Feb. 7, 2009: The IAEA conducts an inspection at Iran’s Fuel Manufacturing Plant in Esfahan. At the time, it was noted that the production line for the natural uranium pellets for the heavy-water reactor fuel was completed and fuel rods produced.
  • Feb. 3, 2009: Iran’s first domestically produced satellite is launched into space with a Salij-2 missile, raising Western concerns that Iran will use this technology to progress its ballistic missile capabilities and apply it to a nuclear military program.
  • Ø Jan. 28, 2009: In response a The Times of London report in which official sources claim that Iran’s yellow cake uranium supplies are running short, Iranian diplomat Mahmoud-Mehdi Soltani announces “Iran is not only capable of supplying fuel for the Bushehr nuclear plant, but can also act as a major exporter.”
  • July 9, 2008: Iran tests nine medium- to long-range missiles capable of hitting Israel and U.S. military bases in the region.
  • July 4, 2008: Iran offers a formal response to the U.N.’s June 16 negotiation proposal. While indicating Iran’s willingness to negotiate, the response fails to address the central issue of whether Iran would put a freeze on its uranium enrichment activities.
  • June 18, 2008: Iran forwards to the IAEA the text of its proposed package for constructive negotiations. The proposal presents a number of issues that Iran believes should comprise a framework for negotiations. These include security, regional and international developments, nuclear energy, terrorism, democracy, drug control, environmental conservation, and economic, technological, and commercial energy cooperation.
  • June 16, 2008: The five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, along with Germany, offer Iran a broad framework for negotiations on issues ranging from nuclear energy to agriculture, civil aviation, and infrastructure. This is done on the condition that Iran freeze its enrichment-related and reprocessing activities at their current rate of development – implicitly accepting the idea of a nuclear Iran.
  • May 26, 2008: Mohamed ElBaradei, director general of the IAEA, circulates a report to the U.N. Security Council and the IAEA Board of Governors. The report finds that Iran is withholding information critical for determining whether it is trying to produce nuclear weapons.
  • Mar. 28, 2008: Iran issues a statement in response to Security Council Resolution 1803 in which it affirms its inalienable right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. It further claims that the United States and three European countries provided “false and erroneous” information to the IAEA concerning Iran’s nuclear program, and that the actions taken by the Security Council contradict the United Nations Charter and are in violation of “peremptory norms of international law.”
  • Mar. 3, 2008: The UN Security Council adopts Resolution 1803, implementing a new round of sanctions against Iran for its continued refusal to suspend uranium enrichment and heavy water-related (a commonly used moderator in nuclear reactors) activity. The resolution calls for states to exercise “vigilance and restraint” in dealing with the transit through their territories of individuals, material and equipment related to the Iranian nuclear program.
  • Feb. 25, 2008: Olli Heinonen, chief U.N. nuclear inspector, organizes a meeting of international representatives on Feb. 25 in Vienna at which he submits video evidence that Iran is working on projects “not consistent with any application other than the development of a nuclear weapon.” Heinonen also reveals at the Feb. 25 meeting that Iran has been testing high-intensity explosives necessary for a nuclear detonation around the town of Parchin, 21 miles (35 km) from Tehran.
  • Jan. 24, 2008: The U.N. Security Council agrees to impose a new set of sanctions on Iran.
  • Nov. 27, 2007: Iranian Defense Minister Mostafa Mohammad-Najjar reports the building of the Ashura missile. The missile has a range of 1,240 miles (2,000 km).
  • Sep. 22, 2007: The “Qadr-1” missile and its launcher are displayed in Iran’s parade of its armed forces. The Qadr-1 is a ballistic missile with a warhead and an explosive. It has the capacity to travel 310 miles (500 km) more than the Shahab-3.
  • Sep. 18, 2007: Iran threatens to fire long-range missiles at American targets in the Middle East should the United States launch an attack against Iran.
  • Aug. 30, 2007: ElBaradei circulates among the IAEA Board of Governors his latest report, “Implementation of the NPT (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty) Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” which covers developments since the report of May 23, 2007. It finds that Iran has not suspended enrichment-related activities and is continuing its construction of a Fuel Enrichment Plant and a heavy-water reactor at Natanz and Arak, respectively. The report also finds that the IAEA is uncertain as to the scope and nature of Iran’s nuclear program.
  • Aug. 22, 2007: Iran develops a remote-controlled launch system that can be used to operate dozens of unmanned Shahab-3 ballistic missile launchers in underground bunkers. After recent upgrades, the Shahab-3 ballistic missiles in Iran’s possession may have a target range of 1,240 miles (2,000 km).
  • June 22, 2007: The IAEA and Iran agree to draft a plan of action to address outstanding concerns regarding Iran’s nuclear program.
  • June 11, 2007: Deputy Interior Minister of Iran Mohammad Baqer Zolghadr warns, “All American bases in the region are within the reach of our weapons.
  • June 10, 2007: Admiral Ali Shamkhani, senior defense adviser to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, warns that Gulf States providing the United States with military cooperation will be key targets of a barrage of retaliatory ballistic missiles.
  • May 17, 2007: North Korea is suspected to have used a launch-pad in Iran to test a new missile capable of hitting American bases in the Pacific island of Guam.
  • May 16, 2007: The U.S. State Department estimates Iran could acquire long-range ballistic missiles capable of striking Europe and the United States in fewer than eight years. The State Department report stresses that foreign assistance could be a key determinant in how quickly Iran progresses, citing the 2006 purchase of 18 intermediate-range ballistic missiles from North Korea modeled after the reverse-engineered Russian SS-N-6 ‘Serb’ (R-27) submarine-launched ballistic missile.
  • Mar. 24, 2007: The U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 1747, reaffirming that Iran shall, without further delay, take the steps required to build confidence in the exclusively peaceful purpose of its nuclear program, including suspending all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities as well as heavy water related projects.
  • Mar. 7, 2007: ElBaradei states that Iran’s actions “render the Agency unable to provide the required assurance about the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program.”
  • Jan. 30, 2007: U.S. Army Brig. Gen. Patrick O’Reilly indicates in a speech to the George C. Marshall Institute that the Pentagon predicts that Iran will develop an intercontinental ballistic missile with the ability to reach the United States shore by 2015.
  • Dec. 27, 2006: The UN Security Council adopts Resolution 1737, demanding that Iran suspend all uranium enrichment-related and reprocessing activities.
  • June 6, 2006: Iran is offered a new proposal on its controversial nuclear program. Although the specifics of the proposal are not unveiled, the offer is known to include economic, technological and political incentives. The offer is believed to include a commitment from the P-5+1 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States) to: help Iran build light-water power plants through joint projects; support Iranian membership in the World Trade Organization; and a U.S. pledge to lift certain economic sanctions against Iran to allow the purchase of agricultural appliances and the sale of Boeing aircraft parts. Concerning uranium enrichment – a major point of contention – the proposal requires Iran to suspend all enrichment-related activities; however, this requirement does not preclude the future possibility that Iran could eventually develop indigenous enrichment capabilities once all outstanding questions have been resolved and international confidence has been restored in the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program.
  • May 31, 2006: In an apparent policy shift, the United States announces its intention to directly participate in negotiations provided that Tehran suspends all enrichment and reprocessing activities. U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice says, “To underscore our commitment to a diplomatic solution and to enhance the prospects of success, as soon as Iran fully and verifiably suspends its enrichment and reprocessing activities, the United States will come to the table with our EU-3 colleagues and meet with Iran’s representatives.”
  • May 9, 2006: In an effort to forge U.N. Security Council unity, the five permanent members of the Security Council and Germany agree to delay UNSC action and postpone voting on a resolution drafted by France and the United Kingdom. Instead, the representatives of the EU-3 will work on devising a comprehensive package of incentives and disincentives to bring Iran to the negotiating table.
  • May 3, 2006: Britain and France present their draft Security Council resolution, which calls on Iran to “suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development…and suspend the construction of a reactor moderated by heavy water.” The resolution also urges states to restrict nuclear trade with Iran by “preventing the transfer of items, materials, goods and technology that could contribute to Iran’s enrichment-related and reprocessing activities and missile programs.”
  • Apr. 29, 2006: The Iranians indicate their willingness to allow greater access to IAEA inspectors under the condition that the Security Council returns the case to the IAEA Board of Governors.
  • Apr. 28, 2006: The Director General of the IAEA submits his report on Iran to the IAEA Board and the Security Council as requested by the March 29 Security Council presidential statement. As with previous reports, the Director General can not provide evidence to verify that Iran’s nuclear program is intended exclusively for peaceful purposes.
  • Apr. 23, 2006: Iran’s foreign ministry spokesman, Hamid-Reza Asefi, declares that Iran’s nuclear activities are “irreversible.” He also states that the Iranians are “determined not to give up our rights to nuclear energy, and suspension of relevant activities are not on our agenda.”
  • Apr. 11, 2006: Iranian President Ahmadinejad announces that Iran has successfully enriched uranium. He states that consequently Iran has officially “joined the group of those countries which have nuclear technology.”
  • Mar. 29, 2006: The Security Council issues a Presidential Statement calling on Iran to reestablish full and sustained suspension of all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development. The statement also requests the director general of the IAEA to report back within 30 days on Iranian compliance with the steps required by the Board.
  • Feb. 7, 2006: Iran requests the IAEA to remove the seals and surveillance systems from safeguarded Iranian facilities.
  • Feb. 4, 2006: The IAEA Board of Governors adopts a resolution requesting the Agency’s director general, Mohamed ElBaradei, share all IAEA reports and resolutions relating to the Iran’s nuclear program with the UN Security Council.
  • Jan. 31, 2006: The IAEA Deputy Director General for Safeguards submits an updated brief about the latest developments on the implementation of the safeguard agreements. According to the brief, Iran handed over a document dealing with uranium metal that is related to the production of nuclear weapons components.
  • Jan. 10, 2006: Despite continuous requests to suspend its activities, Iran removes IAEA seals on enrichment-related equipment and material at Natanz and at two related storage and testing locations, Pars Trash and Farayand Technique.
  • Jan. 8, 2006: The Secretariat receives a note verbale from the Permanent Mission of Iran stating that the “intended scale of R&D is small” and that “all reprocessing in relation to this small scale R&D will be carried out.”
  • Jan. 7, 2006: Iran requests that the IAEA remove 52 Agency seals installed at the facilities of Natanz, Pars Trash, and Farayand Technique before January 9, 2006.
  • Jan. 3, 2006: Mohamed ElBaradei informs the Board of Governors that Iran has decided to resume “R&D activities on the peaceful nuclear energy program which has been suspended as part of its expanded voluntary and non-legally binding suspension.”
  • Nov. 27, 2005: The United Kingdom, France, and Germany (the EU-3) agree to hold talks with Iran on resuming negotiations on the country’s disputed nuclear program, which broke down in August 2005. As a precondition, Iran must be ready to discuss a Russian proposal allowing Iran to maintain a civilian nuclear program but without uranium enrichment capabilities. Uranium enrichment, the most sensitive stage of the nuclear fuel cycle that can be used to make fuel for bombs, would be transferred to Russia under a joint venture.
  • Nov. 24-25, 2005: The Director General reports to the Board of Governors that Iran has provided additional documentation, permitted interviews with relevant individuals, and allowed further access.
  • Nov. 21, 2005: Iranian lawmakers vote to oblige their government to stop allowing snap UN checks of its atomic sites and to resume uranium enrichment if Tehran is referred to the UN Security Council for possible sanctions.
  • Sep. 24, 2005: The Board of Governors adopts a resolution that finds Iran’s failures and breaches to constitute non-compliance with its IAEA safeguards agreements and calls on Iran to return to the negotiating process.
  • Sep. 2, 2005: After the IAEA conducts environmental tests, samples reveal types of nuclear testing that Iran did not include in its inventory of declared nuclear material, calling into question the completeness of Iran’s declarations about its centrifuge enrichment activities. The IAEA continues to urge Iran to suspend its enrichment-related activities, including the production of nuclear materials.
  • Aug. 11, 2005: The Board of Governors adopts a resolution that urges Iran to re-establish full suspension of all enrichment-related activities and to re-instate the IAEA seals that were removed at its uranium conversion facility (UCF) in Esfahan.
  • Aug. 10, 2005: Iran begins to remove the seals on the process lines and the UF4 at the uranium conversion facility in Esfahan. IAEA Director General ElBaradei calls for maximum restraint, no unilateral actions, and continued negotiations by all parties.
  • Aug. 8, 2005: Iran begins feeding uranium ore concentrate into the first part of the process line at the UCF.
  • Aug. 1, 2005: Iran notifies the IAEA that it has decided to resume the uranium conversion activities at the UCF in Esfahan.
  • Nov. 29, 2004: The Board of Governors adopts a resolution that welcomes Iran’s voluntary decision to “continue and extend its suspension of all enrichment related and reprocessing activities.”
  • Sep. 18, 2004: The Board of Governors adopts a resolution stating it “deeply regrets” that Iran’s suspension of enrichment and reprocessing activities “fell significantly short of the Agency’s understandings of those commitments.”
  • June 18, 2004: The Board of Governors adopts a resolution that deplores Iran’s lack of timely cooperation with the IAEA and failure to act in full compliance with its safeguards obligations.
  • June 1, 2004: Director General ElBaradei, in his report to the Board of Governors, identifies three outstanding concerns regarding Iran’s nuclear program: the origin of highly enriched uranium at several nuclear sites, previously undeclared centrifuge technology and Iran’s suspension of uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities.
  • May 21, 2004: Iran submits its initial declaration under the Additional Protocol to its NPT safeguards agreement.
  • May 18, 2004: Iran sends a letter to the IAEA clarifying the suspension agreement, stating, “Iran has not, at any time, made any undertaking not to produce feed material for the enrichment process. The decision taken for voluntary and temporary suspension is based on clearly defined scope which does not include suspension of production of UF6.” The IAEA disagrees with Iran’s analysis.
  • Apr. 7, 2004: During a visit to Iran, Director General ElBaradei announces that Iran has agreed to accelerate its cooperation with the IAEA in addition to a joint action plan with a timetable to deal with outstanding issues.
  • Mar. 15, 2004: The Board of Governors adopts a resolution on the IAEA’s verification of Iran’s nuclear program, noting “outstanding issues” and questions, and requesting Director General ElBaradei to report back to the Board on these matters before the end of May.
  • Mar. 8, 2004: Director General ElBaradei expresses his concern to the Board of Governors that Iran’s declaration of Oct. 21, 2003 did not include any reference to its possession of P-2 centrifuge designs and related research and development, which he views as a setback to Iran’s stated policy of transparency.
  • Dec. 18, 2003: Iran signs the Additional Protocol to its NPT safeguards agreement, granting IAEA inspectors greater authority in verifying the country’s nuclear program.
  • Nov. 26, 2003: The Board of Governors adopts a resolution on the implementation of NPT safeguards in the Islamic Republic of Iran.
  • Nov. 10, 2003: In a letter to the IAEA, Iran’s representative conveys his government’s acceptance of the text of the Additional Protocol and officially announces that Iran has agreed to suspend all uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities.
  • Oct. 31, 2003: Director General ElBaradei remarks that the active and intense period of talks and inspections, begun on October 2, is making good progress.
  • Oct. 21, 2003: Iran and the EU-3 agree on measures aimed at settling all outstanding issues. Iran agrees to engage in full cooperation and transparency with the IAEA in order to address and resolve all requirements and outstanding issues while clarifying and correcting any possible failures and deficiencies raised by the IAEA. Furthermore, Iran decides to sign the IAEA
  • Sep. 12, 2003: The Board of Governors adopts a resolution calling on Iran to accelerate cooperation with the IAEA and provide full transparency.
  • Sep. 8-9, 2003: Director General ElBaradei urges greater cooperation from Iran in order for the IAEA to complete its verification.
  • July 9, 2003: Director General ElBaradei meets with Iranian President Khatami; they agree that a team of senior IAEA experts will remain in Iran to hold technical discussions with Iranian experts on outstanding issues.
  • June 16-20, 2003: The Board of Governors discusses allegations made in a report by Director General ElBaradei that Iran has failed to meet its obligations under its safeguards agreements.
  • Feb. 22-23, 2003: ElBaradei leads an IAEA delegation to Iran and discovers that Iran has two undeclared nuclear production facilities in Natanz and an undeclared enrichment facility, laboratory, and storage facility in Tehran, and that it is building more production facilities in Arak and Esfahan.
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